Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

I too must join with my colleagues, Royce and Payne.

I had the good fortune of traveling with and I cannot

find a more committed and dedicated Member of our House for the

cause of eradicating this genocide, and , who has a distinguished

record of fighting for the people of Sudan and who goes

often and reports back to us, formally and informally, and I want

to thank them.

But unfortunately, what I see right now when I look at the

United States’ policy toward Sudan is the willingness to tolerate

any behavior by the Khartoum regime in the interest of improving

relations.

I think there is something wrong about that. This Administration

has taken several actions, over the past few months, which send

the unmistakable message that Washington is pleased with the behavior

of the Sudanese Government. Well, not from my viewpoint.

I understand that Sudan’s trafficking in persons status has been

upgraded to title II watch list and it is a title II watch list country,

which would put it in the same company as Israel and Switzerland.

This, despite the fact that earlier this year the UN documented

abductions and sexual slavery by the Sudanese troops and we

heard the stories that were given when we were out among the refugees

and they were blood-chilling and blood-curdling.

We were able to spend time with Rusesabagina, the actual manager,

and he told us what really happened, and that movie did not

give you all of the ugliness and the pain and the tragedy that they

actually went through.

For an example, he said when they came into a village and they

would go to the Janjaweed to someone’s home and by the way, they

were high off of drugs and alcohol when they did this, and they

would go to someone’s home and they would get the father or the

head of the household and they would chop off his feet. They

wouldn’t kill him. They would chop off his feet. Then they would

come back the next day, chop off his arms. Then they would go

back to kill him, had he not bled to death before that.

That actually took place and he told us these stories and Don

Cheadle tried to enact them, some of them, in the movie. Well this

kind of madness and savagery is actually taking place and probably as we speak.

The Administration has also issued a waiver to permit the Government

of Sudan to hire a Washington lobbyist to permit the architect

of genocide in Darfur to develop and sell a public relations

strategy on Capitol Hill.

Well let me tell you for one, they can’t sell that to me. They can’t

sell that to Payne and I know the rest of my colleagues will not buy that.

They can come in and put whatever face they want on it, but

those of us who have been there and talked and been among the

refugees know that what they are selling us is bitter goods.

Meanwhile, the Sudanese Government in Khartoum continues to

arm and support the militias, who have murdered tens of thousands

of people and forced over 2 million out of their homes.

As the United States of America, we have an investment in the

Comprehensive Peace Agreement for the Sudan. We need to see it

work, but it will not work if we fail to press the Sudanese Government to stop the genocide.

Unless the United States demands that Sudan end the violence

in Darfur, I fear we will be left with a Comprehensive Peace Agreement

that is neither comprehensive nor peaceful.

I will be listening to hear what specific measures the Administration

will take to first dispel the appearance that we are seeking to

rehabilitate Khartoum’s genocidal regime and second, increase the

pressure on the Khartoum regime to change its behavior and permit

all of its citizens to live in peace.

Once you are out there and you go among the people, you know

that we must move in a positive direction now. We cannot let another

child’s hand be cut off. We cannot let another mother go into

mourning over the loss of her husband, and we cannot let a people

be wiped out on this watch.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I yield back my time.

Thank you so much. We understand that during

the course of the Sudan civil war there were tens of thousands of

children who were employed by various armed groups as child soldiers,

and I guess that USAID or other aid agencies estimate that

20,000 of them have been demobilized since 2001.

Given the importance of restoring children’s access to education

in conflict and post-conflict situations, can you describe for us any

assistance that USAID is providing to address the needs of reintegrating

these child soldiers in the region and what would be the

future plans, if you are aware, for educating children in the Sudan?

I mean how can we bring these children back in so they can reenter childhood?

Sure

Sure, you can

Yes. I would hope that the Chair would entertain

maybe another hearing on the positive steps of some urgent actions

that need to be taken now.

For the future, you know, how do we stabilize these young people?

It is not that I need the information this moment. I would like

to know what the plans are.

If the Chair would be so kind as to hold subsequent hearings, we

can get the information then. If not, I can take it in writing.

But there is no rush on it.

Yes.

Thank you so very much, Madam Secretary.

Thank you. I would like to emphasize that these

children need not only retraining in skill sets, but they are going

to need some psychological and emotional support.

I am a school psychologist in my other life and what I know

about these children, many of them are orphans, many of them

were probably forced into picking up these guns and many of them

were too young to understand the permanency of the death that

they cause, and so I would hope that in your plan in working with

the children, as we say, you work with the whole child.

And be sure that they have a mindset and a

thought process where they will not go back into this behavior

again. I am sure they were forced in probably the most gruesome

ways to take up arms and kill innocent people.

We have to administer to their psychological and

emotional side as well.

Ambassador Frazer, just let me ask you a couple of additional

questions. We have been talking a little bit about the mandate of

the AU, and first of all, if you could assess what your feeling is

about how well they have performed.

I would just say, parenthetically, that both Mr. Simpkins and I,

as much as one can glean from a couple-day visit to Darfur, were

very impressed by their esprit de corps. They were very committed.

When I got to talking to Major Ajumbo, who is from Kenya, we

compared notes, because he was very active in peacekeeping in Sarajevo

in the former Yugoslavia. He is no stranger to being deployed in very difficult straits.

Is there mandate enough? Is it clear enough? How would you like

to see it either changed or expanded? I ask because I am concerned like many.

But again, when you don’t have armored personnel carriers and

you are riding around in small vehicles that hardly provide the

kind of protection necessary for a more robust mandate. But if you

could speak to the mandate issue.

Second, in your prepared testimony you mentioned that we convened

a donor meeting on October 18. Could you just give us some

update on what happened at that donor meeting to help the African Union?

Third, on the issue of Dr. Garang’s tragic death, do you have any

insights on that case? Obviously most of us hope that it was an accident,

but there were also some suggestions, including by the

President of Uganda, that it might have been something other than

that. What does the evidence tell you so far?

Fourth, I have a question about the Lord’s Resistance Army in

or near Juba in the South. What is being done to get the Sudanese

to end their relationship with these Ugandan rebels, the Lord’s Resistance Army?

Finally, mention was made earlier about the $530,000 contract

to CR International. Could you elaborate on what that was all about?

We have had lobby firms in the past that have represented dictatorial

governments, from Haiti to governments in eastern Europe:

Very reputable firms, though not by the clients that they

were able to front for, often came up and made presentations that

had an awful lot of circus appeal.

This was the case when I was leading the effort to stop MFN status

for Romania, because of the Securatate’s horrific abuses of religious

believers, and other human rights abuses under the

Ciaucescu regime.

Every year when MFN status was coming up for review, the Romanian

Government had lobby firms deliver seemingly excellent

talking points that really got you to look askance as to what was

really happening on the ground and put a gloss on gross misbehavior.

So if you could speak to the lobbying firm as well.

Thank you. On the mandate, the AU needs

to tell us if the mandate is not sufficient and they haven’t yet told

us that is the case.

As I said, it is a mandate that clearly states that they can protect

civilians and protect themselves from attack, but it is also

clear that there are certain units that don’t seem to understand

that mandate very clearly.

So part of this is communication. It may be that they need a

more robust mandate, but they need to carry out the one that they

have first and also, as I said, let us know. We are not opposed to

a more robust mandate or for a more robust mandate. We will follow

the lead of the forces in Darfur and try to make sure that they

have what they need, whether that be mandate as well as equipment,

training, and most importantly logistics in command and

control, because as you say, they have operated very well, particularly

at the battalion level.

They have done a fantastic job. They stepped up to the plate and

we should commend their effort and continue to support their area,

but when you start talking about brigade-level operations, they

need more support at the headquarters element. More planning

and more logistics to make sure they get the fuel that they need,

et cetera. So we are looking at how we can assist them.

This is not new to the Administration. We worked very much like

this with the ECOWAS force in Liberia, where we had a EUCOM

element embedded in their planning headquarters to assist with

that brigade-level operation, and it is also the case that it may be

that over time, particularly if we talk about increasing the troop

levels for the AU, that we may need to look at a Blue Hatter UN

force, because the AU may be tapped out in terms of its ability to

get new troop contributors, because frankly they are all over. They

are in Cote d’Ivoire. They are in Liberia. They are in Burundi.

They are stretched fairly thin. The countries that normally come

up and provide troops are fairly stretched. So it may be that we

need to look at a UN Blue Hatting.

But they have done very well and you know I think the African

Union is demonstrating the very philosophy of Africans taking control

of their own destiny and certainly they have stepped up in Darfur.

There is no information that we have that Dr. Garang’s death

was anything but an accident. I think the investigation is going on,

but as far as the initial assessments, it was indeed a tragic, a very

tragic accident.

As far as the LRA is concerned, there has been an agreement between

this Government of Sudan and the Government of Uganda,

to allow for the Government of Uganda to have sort of quick action

in the Southern territory.

We believe that the SPLM will become an effective part of that

relationship, to try to address the LRA threat. The LRA is actually

starting to attack SPLM. So it is a very, very dangerous situation.

I think we have to take and do whatever we can to push the Government

of Sudan, because what we fear is that there may be ele-

ments within the military that continues to provide information to

the LRA and maybe even arms.

They may not represent Government of Sudan policy. That is a

question that is still out there, but there is certainly some type of

assistance we believe continuing with the LRA.

On the question of the lobbyist, the only thing that I can say

there is that one lobbyist cannot change the Administration’s approach to Sudan.

We think that this is a regime that needs fundamental transformation.

That has been our approach from day one. As I said,

January 22, President Bush said that we need to change and stop

the killing that was taking place. That continues to apply in Darfur.

This Administration is very serious about the challenges in

Sudan and where the responsibility lies in Sudan.

So certainly one lobbyist can’t change, in any way, advocating for

whomever, the fundamental approach of the Administration on Sudan.

Thank you so very much and thank you, Mr. Chairman.